The principal-agent problem describes a situation in which a conflict of interest arises between a party who represents the interests of another party. There are many real-life scenarios where this occurs, and it happens due to a type of asymmetric Information.
Essentially, when one party is appointed to act in the interests of another party, there is often a significant degree of trust involved that those interests will be pursued optimally. Unfortunately, trust alone is often insufficient to guarantee compliance, and when it benefits those in whom we place our trust to violate that trust, it is quite commonplace for it to happen.
The principal-agent problem represents a type of market-failure. It can occur whenever it is either impossible, or prohibitively costly, to monitor the actions of the agents that we appoint.
Three of the most important examples of this market-failure are explained in the examples below i.e.:
The principal-agent problem in public corporations occurs when the shareholders (principals) delegate decision-making authority to the executives & managers (agents) of the company. Effective corporate governance of these executives is difficult due to the much better information that they have about the company's operations, financial health, and future prospects, compared to the information available to shareholders.
The interests of shareholders, who seek to maximize their returns, might not always align with the interests and incentives of the executives. This misalignment can lead to conflicts of interest and decision-making that benefits the executives more than the shareholders.
One of the key areas where this problem presents itself is in executive compensation. Executives often receive substantial salaries, bonuses, and stock options. The challenge is to ensure that these compensation packages are structured in a way that incentives for executives to act in the best interest of shareholders.
However, executives might negotiate contracts that guarantee high payouts even if the company underperforms. Typically, if an executive's bonus is tied to short-term profits, they might make decisions that boost immediate gains at the expense of the company's long-term sustainability.
This is exactly what happened in the early 2000s when the Enron scandal revealed how executives had engaged in accounting fraud to hide liabilities and thereby inflate the company's stock price. This in turn increased their bonuses and their stock options. This was so severe that it ultimately led to the company's bankruptcy, and massive losses for shareholders.
In democratic governments, the principal-agent problem refers to the challenges that arise when elected representatives (agents) are entrusted with making decisions and policies on behalf of the citizens (principals) who elected them. The interests of the elected representatives may not always align perfectly with the interests and preferences of the constituents.
This misalignment can lead to elected officials making decisions that prioritize personal gain, special interests, or re-election over the broader welfare of the public.
For example, a legislator might support policies favorable to a particular industry if he/she receives campaign contributions from businessmen within that industry. This can happen even if those policies lead to higher prices, or other negative consequences, for consumers.
Political candidates often rely on financial support from various sources to fund their election campaigns. The need to secure funding for re-election can create a conflict of interest, leading politicians to prioritize the interests of donors over the concerns of the general electorate. This situation can influence policy decisions on issues such as taxation, regulation, and corporate subsidies.
Regulatory agencies are tasked with overseeing specific industries to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. However, these agencies can be susceptible to regulatory capture, where industry insiders influence regulatory decisions to favor their interests. This can lead to lax enforcement of regulations, harming consumers and the public interest.
For example, a regulatory agency overseeing environmental standards might be influenced by the fossil fuel industry, leading to weakened environmental regulations and sub-optimal prices and output levels.
The principal-agent problem in financial services arises when individuals or entities (the principals) delegate their financial decisions to financial advisors, brokers, fund managers, or other professionals (the agents). The principals rely on these agents' expertise and knowledge to make informed investment choices that align with their financial goals.
However, the agents may not always act in the best interests of the principals, leading to conflicts of interest and potential financial losses.
Financial advisors and brokers may receive commissions or bonuses based on the financial products they sell to clients. This creates a conflict of interest, as advisors might recommend products that generate higher commissions for themselves, even if these products are not the best fit for the client's investment objectives and risk tolerance.
A corrupt financial advisor might recommend a high-commission investment product to a client, even though a low-cost alternative might better suit his/her client’s needs. The advisor's recommendation prioritizes personal financial gain over the client's best interests.
Churning and excessive trading refers to a practice whereby brokers excessively buy and sell securities within a client's account in order to incur extra transaction fees with each trade. This unnecessary trading activity can lead to increased costs for the client without providing any real benefit.
While the broker profits from the extra commissions on the trades, the client bears the costs, leading to reduced overall returns.
In each of the three examples above, addressing the principal-agent problem requires a combination of regulatory frameworks, structural changes, and incentive alignment mechanisms. Striking the right balance of these helps to ensure that agents act in the best interests of the principals they represent.
Clear definitions of metrics such as financial performance (profitability, revenue growth), shareholder returns, and operational efficiency (minimization of production costs) help to guide executive decisions that benefit principals.
Introduction of long-term incentive plans relating to stock options, which tie a portion of executive compensation to the company's stock performance over an extended period, helps to align executive interests with long-term shareholder value.
Implementation of "say-on-pay" policies, with external compensation consultants and independent compensation committees, allow shareholders and directors to set executive compensation packages. This helps to align those packages with company performance.
Implement clawback provisions in executive contracts. These provisions allow the company to recoup executive bonuses or other forms of compensation in the event of financial restatements or other performance-related issues.
Incorporation of risk-adjusted performance metrics, in order to discourage excessive risk-taking for short-term gains, helps prevent executives from pursuing strategies that might boost short-term results at the expense of long-term sustainability.
Holding regular elections to ensure accountability helps to provide a mechanism for voters to hold elected officials accountable for their actions and decisions.
Stricter campaign finance regulations can help reduce the potential for undue influence by special interest groups. Public Financing of Campaigns can reduce the dependence of elected officials on private interests and thereby promote policies that benefit the public. Enforcement and strengthening of lobbying regulations can also help prevent the undue influence of powerful interest groups on policymakers.
Establishment of mechanisms for regular feedback from constituents. Understanding the needs and preferences of the electorate can help representatives make decisions that align with the interests of those constituents.
Alignment of fee structures with portfolio performance. In asset management, fees based on the performance of the portfolio create an incentive for managers to generate positive returns for their clients. Asset managers should prioritize the financial well-being of their clients, aligning investment strategies with client goals and risk tolerance.
Use of appropriate performance benchmarks against relevant market indices or peer groups helps clients assess the value provided by asset managers.
Compliance with regulations and fiduciary responsibilities reinforces the obligation of asset managers to act in the best interest of their clients, rather than mis-selling them inappropriate policies that offer better commissions.