
This article explains how credit creation operates in the modern fiat, fractional-reserve banking system. It focuses on the accounting mechanics, institutional practices, and balance-sheet operations through which credit creation expands and contracts the money supply.
The purpose is descriptive i.e., to clarify how money is actually created today, not to argue that this system is necessarily optimal or economically desirable.
Credit creation theory is controversial. Critics of modern banking systems argue that the ability of banks to create money through lending can distort interest-rate signals, separate credit from real saving, and contribute to recurring boom-bust cycles. However, flawed as the system is, we still need to understand it.
Credit creation occurs at the moment a commercial bank extends a loan. When a bank approves a mortgage, business loan, or overdraft, it does not transfer pre-existing money from savers to borrowers. Instead, the bank simultaneously records a new loan asset on its balance sheet and a new deposit liability in the borrower’s account.
That deposit is new money. It can be spent immediately and is indistinguishable from any other bank deposit in the economy. Just as lending creates deposits, loan repayment destroys them, meaning that money creation and destruction are inseparable from the credit cycle. This accounting operation is the core of modern money creation.
For decades, economics textbooks taught that banks create money by lending out deposits in a fixed multiple of their reserves (the money they hold at the central bank). However, this explanation (known as the money multiplier) does not describe how the modern fractional reserve banking system actually operates. In reality, money is created through credit creation, a process driven in real-time by bank lending decisions, borrower demand, and balance-sheet mechanics rather than by a mechanical pre-existing reserve constraint.
The expansion of the money supply is not the result of repeated relending of the same funds, but of independent lending decisions made by banks whenever they judge a loan to be profitable and permissible. The constraint is not the prior availability of money but the bank’s willingness to create it.
Once the newly created deposit is spent, payments may flow to other banks. At that point, reserves become relevant. Banks use central bank reserves to settle interbank payments, but this settlement occurs after the credit has already been created. If a bank needs additional reserves to complete settlement, it can borrow them from other banks or obtain them from the central bank.
In modern monetary systems, central banks supply reserves elastically in order to maintain control over short-term interest rates and ensure the stability of the payment system. As a result, reserves accommodate lending rather than constrain it.
Understanding credit creation is essential for making sense of liquidity crises, asset bubbles, and the limits of monetary policy. Once the mechanics are understood, many long-standing confusions about money and banking fall away.
The traditional money multiplier model reverses the real sequence of events. It assumes that banks first receive deposits, then hold a fraction as reserves, and only afterwards lend the remainder. In practice, deposits are the result of lending, not the prerequisite for it.
The supposed multiplier linking reserves to deposits turns out to be an unstable ratio that moves in response to credit conditions, regulation, and central bank operations. It describes an outcome after the fact, not a causal mechanism.
This is why large increases in bank reserves, such as those created through quantitative easing, do not mechanically translate into proportional increases in bank lending. Credit creation depends on expected returns, risk assessments, capital constraints, and borrower demand.
Without these, additional reserves simply remain idle on bank balance sheets.
Although banks are not limited by reserves in advance, credit creation is not unlimited. The most important constraint is bank capital. Banks must maintain sufficient equity relative to the riskiness of their assets, and this requirement directly limits balance-sheet expansion.
Profitability also plays a central role.
Banks will not create credit if the expected return does not justify the risk and regulatory cost. Borrower creditworthiness matters because loans that are unlikely to be repaid destroy capital and threaten solvency. Broader economic conditions shape demand for credit, meaning that lending expands in booms and contracts in recessions regardless of the quantity of reserves in the system.
Collateral influences the terms and distribution of credit creation rather than its aggregate quantity. Rising asset prices increase collateral values and make additional lending appear safer, which can amplify credit cycles, particularly in property markets. Falling asset prices have the opposite effect, tightening credit conditions and accelerating downturns.
The framework described above is known in economics as Endogenous Money Theory. Its central claim is that the money supply is not fixed or exogenously determined by the central bank, but instead emerges endogenously from the interaction between banks, borrowers, and the broader economy.
In this view, banks do not wait for reserves or prior savings before lending. When a creditworthy borrower seeks a loan and a bank judges it profitable under regulatory and capital constraints, the loan is issued and a matching deposit is created. The quantity of money in circulation therefore expands in response to credit demand, not in response to a pre-set monetary base. Central banks then accommodate the reserve demand generated by this process in order to maintain payment-system stability and their chosen short-term interest rate.
Endogenous money theory reverses the causal logic of the traditional money multiplier. Rather than reserves determining deposits, lending determines deposits, and deposits determine reserve demand. Because central banks target interest rates rather than reserve quantities, they must supply reserves elastically at the policy rate. Attempts to restrict lending by limiting reserves would destabilize the payment system and undermine rate control, which is why such constraints are not used in modern monetary frameworks.
An essential implication of endogenous money is that money is also destroyed endogenously. When borrowers repay loans, the corresponding bank deposits are extinguished. Credit defaults reduce bank capital, constraining future lending. As a result, the money supply expands during credit booms and contracts during deleveraging phases, helping to explain why recessions are often characterized by falling money growth even in the presence of aggressive central bank intervention.
Within the endogenous money tradition, economists have debated the degree to which reserve accommodation is frictionless. Some emphasize near-perfect elasticity at the policy rate, while others highlight the role of liquidity risk, regulation, and balance-sheet stress. These differences do not alter the core conclusion: reserves do not mechanically limit lending in advance. Credit creation is governed by profitability, capital, expectations, and demand – not by a reserve multiplier.
The fact that credit creation is endogenous does not imply that it is economically neutral. Because banks can expand credit without prior saving, the volume and direction of credit creation are guided by interest rates, expectations, and asset prices rather than by underlying resource constraints. This can cause credit creation to accelerate in periods of optimism and contract sharply when conditions reverse.
Critics of modern credit creation theory argue that these dynamics systematically distort the price of credit, encouraging investment projects that appear profitable under expansive financial conditions but cannot be sustained once credit growth slows.
From this perspective, financial crises are not primarily the result of policy mistakes or insufficient regulation, but of the inherent instability of a system that allows large-scale credit creation without firm monetary anchors.
Ideas about credit creation have been contested for more than two centuries. In the early nineteenth century, British economists debated the nature of banking during the Bullionist Controversy:
These disagreements reappeared in different forms throughout monetary history.
More recently, central banks themselves have publicly clarified how money creation actually works. Official publications now explicitly state that bank lending creates deposits and that reserves do not act as a binding constraint on lending. In this sense, modern institutional descriptions have moved closer to the Banking School and Post-Keynesian traditions than to the older multiplier-based framework.
Understanding credit creation is essential, but it should not lead to the mistaken belief that central bank money creation is harmless or irrelevant. History shows clearly that hyperinflation has never been driven by commercial bank lending alone.
Every documented hyperinflation has occurred in circumstances where governments relied on massive and sustained central bank money creation to finance fiscal shortfalls, often after wars, state collapse, or the loss of productive capacity.
In such episodes, money creation is no longer anchored by credit assessment, balance-sheet discipline, or expectations of repayment. Central bank liabilities expand directly into circulation, typically through direct deficit financing or forced purchases of government debt. Once confidence in the currency erodes, the demand for money collapses, prices accelerate, and the process becomes self-reinforcing.
In this sense, money printing is not a neutral or risk-free activity, and history provides no counterexamples. At the same time, it is crucial to distinguish these extreme cases from the normal operation of modern monetary systems.
In stable economies, most money is created as explained above – through bank credit creation tied to lending decisions, capital constraints, and borrower demand. Central bank money plays a supporting role, ensuring settlement and interest-rate control.
Large expansions of reserves, such as those seen during quantitative easing, did not result in immediate runaway inflation not because they were economically neutral, but because they counteracted a powerful deflationary force created by decades of prior credit expansion. QE stabilized a system that might otherwise have collapsed through widespread bank failures and debt liquidation, replacing private balance-sheet contraction with central bank balance-sheet expansion.
The key distinction is therefore not between “printing money” and “not printing money,” but between money creation that is constrained by economic structure and expectations, and money creation that is driven by prior decades of fiscal irresponsibility in the absence of credible limits. Hyperinflation arises when money creation becomes a substitute for taxation or borrowing in a collapsing institutional environment, not simply because a central bank expands its balance sheet.
Recognizing the central role of credit creation helps clarify this distinction. It explains why private credit booms tend to generate asset inflation and financial instability rather than hyperinflation, while historically unprecedented price explosions occur only when the state itself loses control of fiscal and monetary credibility.
How does credit
creation influence interest rates in the economy?
Credit creation affects interest rates by determining the supply of bank loans relative to demand. When banks expand lending rapidly, the effective supply of credit increases, putting downward pressure on borrowing costs. Conversely, if credit creation slows, the scarcity of loans can push interest rates higher. Central banks influence this process indirectly by setting policy rates and regulating bank capital requirements.
What role do shadow
banks play in credit creation?
Shadow banks, such as investment funds or special-purpose vehicles, create credit outside the traditional banking system. They issue short-term liabilities that function like deposits and fund long-term loans, expanding the money-like instruments in circulation. While not subject to the same reserve or capital requirements, shadow banks are a key driver of systemic credit growth and financial leverage.
Can credit creation
lead to income inequality?
Yes. Credit creation disproportionately expands asset prices, which benefits individuals and institutions that already hold financial assets. Those without asset ownership gain little from the new credit, meaning that periods of rapid bank lending and QE often correlate with widening wealth and income gaps.
Does credit creation
always lead to inflation?
Not necessarily. Credit creation can expand the money supply without immediate consumer price inflation, especially if the new money primarily circulates in asset markets rather than goods and services. Inflation tends to arise when credit expansion translates into increased demand for goods, services, and commodities, or when confidence in the currency declines.
What risks does
excessive credit creation pose to financial stability?
Excessive credit creation can inflate asset bubbles, encourage excessive leverage, and reduce risk discipline among banks and borrowers. When asset prices correct, widespread defaults can occur, triggering bank failures, liquidity crises, and broader economic downturns.
In the modern banking system, money is created through credit creation. Bank lending brings new deposits into existence, while loan repayment and default destroy them. Reserves adjust afterward to support settlement and interest-rate control, rather than acting as a binding constraint on credit creation. The traditional money multiplier fails because it reverses this sequence and misrepresents how banking systems actually operate.
Understanding credit creation is essential, but it does not require treating the modern system as optimal. The same mechanisms that allow credit creation to expand flexibly can also weaken interest-rate signals, amplify financial cycles, and encourage unsustainable investment during periods of rapid credit growth. When expectations shift, these imbalances are revealed through defaults, balance-sheet contraction, and economic downturns.
My aim in this article has been to explain how credit creation works in practice. Whether credit creation should operate in this way is another matter, and personally I strongly favor a full reserve banking system instead. Nevertheless, a clear analysis of credit creation is the necessary starting point for that debate.
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About the Author
Steve Bain is an economics writer and analyst with a BSc in Economics and experience in regional economic development for UK local government agencies. He explains economic theory and policy through clear, accessible writing informed by both academic training and real-world work.
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